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Abstract 
This paper employs firm-level panel data of 57 incumbent and entrant firms for 23 
European countries in the decade from 2003 to 2012. We examine the impact of 
service- and facility-based competition on firm level investment as well as the strategic 
effects underlying infrastructure investment decisions. At the same time we explicitly 
model the structural dynamics of broadband investment using dynamic panel estimation 
techniques. We find that facility-based competition exerts a positive and significant 
impact on both incumbents and entrants implying that incumbents’ and entrants’ 
investment decisions are strategic complements. Moreover, this strategic 
complementarity is much more pronounced with respect to the entrants. Finally, we 
show that service-based competition appears to have no significant impact on the 
investment decision of incumbents and entrants and that there is no supportive 
evidence for the so-called “ladder of investment” hypothesis. With respect to the later 
phase of market regulation, service-based competition exerts a negative impact on 
entrants’ investment. 
 
JEL classification: L43, L52, L96. 
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1. Introduction 
Following the liberalization of electronic communications markets in 1997/1998, the 
European Commission (EC) issued several guidelines to introduce competition in those 
markets by means of mandated access obligations. Typically, these obligations were 
asymmetrically imposed on formerly state-owned “incumbent” operators who were 
deemed to have significant market power related to the possession of monopoly-like 
legacy infrastructure. In particular, the EC in its Directive 2887/2000 has foreseen 
mandated wholesale access to the local loop (European Parliament & Council, 2000) 
and thus enabled new market operators (“entrants”) to offer retail narrowband voice and 
broadband services directly to customers. Service-based competition that hinges 
directly upon a set of pre-defined access regulations and cost-oriented wholesale 
access charges, in particular, allows the entrant to offer competitive retail services 
without getting engaged in timely, costly, and risky roll-out of own access network 
infrastructure, if access obligations are effectively implemented by the national 
regulatory authorities (NRAs). In the early stages of market liberalization service-based 
competition massively increased price competition and thus had an immediate and 
positive welfare effect in terms of static efficiency. 
The EC also emphasized in its Directive 2002/19/EC that mandated access 
should not reduce the incentives of entrants to invest in alternative infrastructure 
(European Parliament & Council, 2002). The latter, in turn, would be essential to foster 
competition in the long-run in terms of dynamic efficiency. Moreover, infrastructure- (or: 
facility-) based competition involves a much lower degree of industry micro-
management and hence lower administrative costs. However, the EC has never 
explicitly mandated the entrant to start investing in its own network after a certain period 
of time, with a formal requirement to enter facility-based competition. Consequently, the 
decision to invest in own facilities is up to the entrant contingent, inter alia, on regulatory 
investment conditions. As a result, wireline communications markets are still 
characterized by two different types of entrants, those who remain service-based 
competitors, and those who gradually self-deploy network infrastructure and thus also 
enter facility-based competition becoming at least partly independent network operators. 
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The latter development adheres to the so-called “ladder of investment” (LoI) hypothesis 
(Cave & Vogelsang, 2003; Cave, 2006). According to this hypothesis, regulatory-
induced service-based competition serves as a stepping stone for entrants to engage 
progressively in backward integration and ultimately to self-deploy access 
infrastructure.1 The former, however, still represents by far the predominant group of 
entrants.  
One of the most controversial questions is which mode of competition is 
preferable in order to lower prices and to achieve high investment at the same time. 
This issue becomes even more important in view of the deployment of fibre-based next 
(or second) generation communications infrastructure; in particular, it is hotly debated 
whether emerging communications infrastructure should be subjected to a similar set of 
sector-specific access regulations and whether service-based competition is essential, 
in a similar way as in the beginning of liberalization of first generation networks, or if it 
rather diminishes ex ante investment incentives.2 Infrastructure-based operators argue 
that service-based competition via mandatory access regulations restricts their ability to 
generate sufficient revenues and would thus be detrimental to ex ante investment 
incentives and network innovations. Conversely, for NRAs and service-based entrants a 
potential threat of new and possibly more intense monopoly areas arises in the course 
of the deployment of fibre-based infrastructure, which entails the need to have again an 
appropriate access regulation in place. 
Utilizing the experience of a decade of regulating first-generation broadband 
networks, our paper intends to draw lessons on the impact of both modes of competition 
on investment in fixed broadband markets. In answering this, we employ an unbalanced 
panel data set of 57 operators from 23 European Union (EU) member states for the 
years from 2003 to 2012. The period of analysis thus covers the beginning of service-
based competition based on wholesale broadband access regulations and the early 
phase of transition to next generation infrastructure deployment that has been initiated 
                                                          
1
 Hence in the U.S. the LoI is known as the “stepping stone” hypothesis. 
2
 The reader is referred to Telecommunications Policy special issue published in 2013 (Volume 37(10)) 
which collects controversial papers on the topic “Regulatory approaches and investment in new 
communications infrastructure”. 
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only recently in most EU member states.3 We therefore exploit information over a whole 
decade of market liberalization and regulation involving both modes of competition in 
order to have a sound basis to truly inform the debate on the future regulatory policies 
to be imposed on new communications infrastructure. 
Our empirical specification incorporates: i) generalized methods of moments 
(GMM) and bias-corrected fixed effects estimators to account for the endogeneity bias 
due to the dynamic specification of the investment equation, omitted variables and 
reverse causality patterns; as suggested by the related literature (Grajek & Röller, 
2011), the latter appears to be of particular relevance for the relationship between 
regulation and competition on the one hand and investment activities on the other; ii) 
strategic firm-level effects regarding investment decisions, and finally, iii) the structural 
dynamics of adjustment costs in terms of a dynamic investment accelerator model. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the related 
and recent empirical literature. Section 3 outlines our basic hypotheses. Section 4 
describes the data set underlying our empirical investigation. Section 5 presents the 
empirical baseline specification and our identification strategy. Section 6 describes and 
interprets the main results of the empirical analysis. Section 7 summarizes and 
compiles important assessments for future regulatory policies. 
2. Empirical evidence 
In this section we review the most related and recent contributions from the empirical 
literature. In doing this, we build on the well-cited survey by Cambini and Jiang (2009) 
who review the older literature on investment and regulation. The authors conclude that 
the majority of the contributions find that service-based competition in terms of different 
forms of cost-based access regulations discouraged both incumbents and alternative 
competitors from investing in fixed networks. In the following we also consider empirical 
                                                          
3
 Note that we exclude wireless mobile broadband access technologies in our analysis. The latter have 
already been facilitated by previous mobile technologies such as GPRS, EDGE, UMTS und HSDPA but 
due to technological limitations did not represent a substitute access device to the majority of consumers 
as regards the overall analysis period. Of course, mobile broadband services have become increasingly 
popular in recent years and might become a stronger competitor even as regards second generation 
(wireline) broadband services in view of the latest wireless communications technologies (LTE). 
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studies that employ measures of broadband penetration which is output-related and 
hence might provide a better proxy for consumer welfare in efficiently functioning 
markets as explicitly argued by some authors (Crandall et al. 2013, p. 266).4 
Bouckaert et al. (2010) examine the determinants of broadband penetration 
based on data for 20 OECD countries for the years from 2003 to 2008. The authors find 
that infrastructure-based competition has a positive impact on broadband penetration, 
whereas service-based competition is an impediment to penetration. The authors argue 
that their findings suggest that the LoI hypothesis does not provide sufficient justification 
for imposing comprehensive broadband access regulations. Grajek and Röller (2011) 
empirically estimate the relationship between regulation and investment as regards 
telecommunications investment of incumbent and entrant operators using data for EU 
member states for the years from 1997 to 2006. The authors are among the few who 
explicitly take into account the endogeneity problem of regulation and investment in 
terms of reverse causality, however, the authors ignore the bias that arises from their 
dynamic investment specification. Using a formal regulatory index the authors find that 
access regulation reduces both individual firm and total industry investment. Moreover, 
the authors find that incumbents invest more in response to investment increases of 
entrants indicating that investments are strategic complements, although the 
complementarity is not significant the other way around, i.e. from the incumbents to 
entrants. Bacache et al. (2013) examine the incentives embedded in the EU regulatory 
framework on migration from old to new fibre-based access infrastructures using data 
from 15 EU member states for 17 semesters over the period from July 2002 to July 
2010. The authors relate the number of access lines based on new access technologies 
to the number of unbundling and bitstream lines in order to test the validity of the LoI 
hypothesis. Whereas the authors find some support for the LoI hypothesis for the 
migration from bitstream access to local loop unbundling at the lower rungs of the 
                                                          
4
 Of course, increases in investment do not necessarily imply welfare increases (Höffler, 2007) in general. 
However, regarding communications markets and broadband markets, in particular, one can first argue 
that the “Averch-Johnson” effect (too much capital employed) can be expected to be small because 
service-based as well as infrastructure-based competition has already transformed legacy monopoly-like 
market structures into more competitive market structures since the beginning of liberalization and sector-
specific regulation. Second, as argued convincingly in the empirical literature (e.g., Czernich et al. (2011); 
Koutroumpis (2009); Röller and Waverman (2001); Thompson and Garbacz (2007)), one can expect 
substantial positive externalities related to broadband infrastructures that are not captured in the markets. 
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ladder with lower investment requirements, there is no empirical support for the 
hypothesis that mandatory local loop unbundling fosters entrants to invest in new and 
much more cost intense communications infrastructures. Nardotto et al. (2012) find 
similar results using broadband penetration quarterly data from December 2005 to 
December 2009 for the whole of the UK. The authors find support for a short ladder 
leading from resale to bitstream access and unbundling but not to self-deployed 
entrants’ infrastructure. Crandall et al. (2013) is a recent OECD based study that utilizes 
country level data for the years from 2001 to 2010. The authors find that unbundling 
obligations have almost no significant impact on broadband penetration in the short run 
but a significantly negative impact on penetration in the long run. Finally, Briglauer et al. 
(2013) are the first to investigate the determinants of fibre-based infrastructure 
deployment using data for the years from 2005 to 2011. Their empirical specification 
incorporates investment data in physical units at the EU27 country-level. The authors 
find that the more effective wholesale broadband access regulation and hence service-
based competition is, the more negative the impact on fibre deployment. 
Summarizing, the recent empirical analysis on access regulations and 
investment seem to prove the results in Cambini and Jiang (2009), according to which 
service-based competition and related broadband access regulations tend to be either 
statistically unrelated or negatively related to investment incentives. Furthermore, there 
is evidence that infrastructure-based competition exerts a positive impact on investment 
at the aggregate level. To the best of the authors´ knowledge, there is no work that 
employs firm-level investment data, incorporates the structural dynamics of broadband 
investment and simultaneously takes into account both modes of competition as well as 
the relevant sources of endogeneity. This paper intends to fill this gap and identify the 
causal effects of service-based and facility-based competition on broadband 
investment. 
3. Hypotheses 
This section identifies the main determinants of broadband investments in Europe in the 
decade from 2003 to 2012 and sets out corresponding hypotheses, which are aligned to 
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the main modes of competition in fixed-broadband markets: Service-based competition 
(Section 3.1) and facility-based competition (Section 3.2). Moreover, we explicitly outline 
the dynamics of broadband investment in terms of a flexible accelerator investment 
model (Section 3.3). 
3.1. Service-based competition 
At the beginning of market liberalization, EU member states introduced asymmetric 
(one-way) access regulations imposed on the incumbent operators, which enabled 
service-based competition at cost-oriented access charges set by NRAs. The EU 
regulatory framework basically provides three different kinds of wholesale access 
obligations, namely: i) “resale”, ii) “bitstream”, and iii) “unbundling”. Simple resale means 
that the entrant sells the services of the incumbent with no technical scope of product 
differentiation i.e., value is added only at the retail level, such as branding, advertising 
or customer care. In this case the entrant is hardly confronted with fixed and sunk costs. 
In the case of bitstream, the entrant has to build its own backbone networks, which 
enables him to differentiate the quality characteristics of its retail services to some 
extent. In the case of unbundling, the entrant operates much more independently, since 
it gets physical access to the incumbent’s local loop copper lines.  
In view of multi-level access remedies, the LoI hypothesis has been considered 
as a guiding principle in the EU regulatory framework tool to promote both price 
competition and broadband investment (ERG, 2005). An entrant that gradually invests 
moving from rung to rung (from simple resale to bitstream and then to unbundling and 
self-deployed infrastructure) shows incentives to add value to its services and operate 
more and more independently; in the first step service-based entrants will acquire more 
information and establish a customer base, and therefore in the second step they will be 
able to invest in their own infrastructure, which ultimately results in facility-based 
competition representing the top of the ladder (Briglauer & Gugler, 2013). The latter, 
i.e., the last rung of the ladder, also represents by far the highest investment 
requirements for alternative operators. As a consequence of facility-based and service-
based competition, retail prices decrease and product variety increases, which may lead 
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to an increase in total demand for broadband services. This demand increasing effect 
might also increase investment incentives by incumbents (Foros, 2004; Kotakorpi, 
2006). Moreover, in the case of excessive capacities, when more downstream 
competition decreases retail prices, which in turn may be associated with an increase in 
total demand, it could be the case that the regulated incumbent is almost one-to-one 
compensated for foregone monopoly profits. From this point of view, rather than being 
substitutes, service- and facility-based competition would complement each other and 
there would be no inter-temporal trade-off between static and dynamic efficiency. 
Therefore, access regulations would ideally resolve this trade-off, inducing retail 
competition and fostering investment of entrant and incumbent operators according to 
the LoI hypothesis. 
However, several opposing effects predict that stricter access regulations 
deteriorate investment incentives of incumbent and/or entrant operators: first, the 
incumbent will only be able to make monopoly profits until asymmetric access regulation 
is introduced which enables the entrant to enter the market at cost-oriented access 
charges. However, rents earned from wholesale access at cost-oriented prices are 
simply lower than monopoly rents from selling infrastructure directly to retail customers. 
This effect gets reinforced in case risks are shifted from entrants to incumbents, which 
is typically the case under standard cost-based access regimes (Pindyck 2007; Valletti 
2003). Guthrie (2006) and Bourreau and Dogan (2006) emphasize that the ex ante 
regulated incumbent is exposed to a considerable risk, while the entrant has second-
mover advantage due to the investment flexibility available in terms of exploiting new 
technologies. Innovations, such as xDSL technologies, enable the entrant to offer new 
products or higher quality services without facing the risk due to demand-side 
uncertainties. Thus, having the second mover advantage enables the entrant to avoid 
investment in unsuccessful technologies after getting sufficient information from the 
market. Guthrie (2006) criticizes that regulatory models do not incorporate the option 
value of “wait and see strategies” that the entrant obtains by investing second. Overall, 
favourable access regulations constitute substantial opportunity costs for entrants’ 
investment and may thus postpone or hinder their infrastructure investment.  
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Summarizing, service-based competition and related access regulations exert a 
positive impact on entrants’ investment incentives only if the LoI hypothesis holds true 
and dominates entrants’ opportunity costs (representing the benefit from cheap access). 
However, the LoI hypothesis appears reasonable only with respect to moves along the 
lower rungs of the ladder which come along with comparatively low investment 
requirements, especially for moves from resale to bitstream access. With respect to the 
investment incentives of the incumbent the net effect is indeterminate to the extent that 
service-based competition simultaneously captures negative investment incentives 
related to the strictness of (standard cost-based) access regulations, as well as the 
demand expanding effect according to which total revenues increase with the level of 
service-based competition. 
3.2. Facility-based competition 
In this case, we add another dimension of competition stemming from alternative 
broadband operators, namely the entrant’s own self-deployed access lines, which 
represent facility-based competition that does not depend on any kind of asymmetric 
access regulations. The entrant by investing in facility-based access infrastructure 
enjoys additional benefits referring to entrepreneurial independency or better quality of 
services. Ideally, and as stipulated by the LoI, the entrant first establishes its market 
position and increases its customer base via service-based competition which then 
enables the entrant to ultimately connect its service-based customers to its own 
facilities. In reality, however, besides incumbents only operators with access to 
infrastructure elements prior to market liberalization substantially invested in deploying 
access networks. Most notably, these networks refer to coax-cable broadband 
infrastructure with prior cable TV networks or municipal utilities with prior duct 
infrastructure. In fact, the LoI did not induce any substantial self-deployed access 
infrastructure on the side of pure service-based entrants which can be interpreted as the 
“natural outcome of the economics of fixed broadband access” (Vogelsang 2013, p. 
212). Bender and Goetz (2011) provide a theoretical explanation why entrants do not 
climb the rungs according to the LoI hypothesis. The authors model competition 
between the incumbent and an entrant who faces a make-or-buy decision as regards 
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the upstream level. The authors argue that the service-based entrant has, in principle, 
an incentive to invest in view of possible cost savings but is also confronted with a 
strategic effect: lower costs enable lower retail prices, however, these might imply 
aggressive pricing and investment reactions from the incumbent in order to limit 
consumer migration to the entrants’ retail services.  
Wireline facility-based competition stemming from entrant operators hereinafter 
only refers to access networks of cable operators complemented by some municipal 
investment activities which is distinctively different from activities of service-based 
entrants acting at the lower rungs of the ladder. Regarding the relationship between 
facility-based competition and investment, there is no clear prediction at the micro-level 
as shown in Schmutzler (2010) in general. Rather, the relationship depends on the 
definition of competitive intensity and the oligopoly framework and consequently 
investments can be increasing or decreasing functions of competition. However, it is 
well-known from the pre-emption literature that a potential infrastructure provider has an 
incentive to pre-empt another infrastructure provider by being the first and thus reducing 
the rivals’ profitability and incentives to invest. As a consequence, infrastructure 
providers might get engaged in a race to invest first and earn the rents. Such a pre-
emption race is of particular relevance for investment upgrades in telecommunications 
(Gans, 2001; Grajek & Röller, 2011; Guthrie, 2006) where infrastructure duplication is 
only possible in areas with high population density whereas – due to the economics of 
fixed broadband access – infrastructure investment is only profitable, if it all, for one 
operator in all other areas. This opens up the potential for a long-lasting first-mover 
advantage which thus fosters ex ante investment incentives.  
Summarizing, incumbents’ and entrants’ infrastructure investment decisions 
reinforce each other, i.e. investment decisions are strategic complements, if the 
operators engage in pre-emption strategies and “race” for the first-mover advantage in 
terms of aggressive price competition at the retail level and infrastructure investment. 
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3.3. Investment dynamics: a flexible accelerator model 
Below we present a flexible accelerator investment model using a neoclassical 
production function with constant returns to scale and no substitution between input 
factors. Thus, it only takes into account quantity variables, while price variables are not 
included into the model (Chirinko, 1993). The first derivative and cross partials of the 
production function are positive and the second derivates are negative. This implies that 
the marginal products are positive at decreasing rates and are positively related to other 
input factors employed. Thus, increasing the output level would require an increase in 
inputs, following the objective of cost minimization and depending on the adjustment 
cost (Eisner, 1978). 
The main and most important assumption of this model is about the firm’s 
desired level of capital expressed in terms of a fixed capital to output ratio. We denote 
the desired level of capital of the firm i  at time t  by tiK , , the output level by tiY ,  and the 
capital to output ratio by  . Based on the notion of optimal capital accumulation, the 
optimal level of capital is proportionally related to the level of output: 
(1)   
where 

1,tiK  and 1, tiY  represent the desired level of capital and the output level of the 
firm i  in the previous period of time 1t , respectively. Consequently, a high capital to 
output ratio is associated with high investment expenditures, and vice versa. In the 
simple accelerator investment model   is constant. If the adjustment is immediate and 
ignoring depreciation, investment would be simply the difference in the desired capital 
stocks in period t and t-1: 
(2)  
where tiI ,  represents current investment in period t  for firm i . However, the older 
literature (Eisner, 1978; Koyck, 1954) as well as recent and telecommunications related 
evidence (Briglauer et al., 2013; Grajek & Röller, 2011) suggest that it is unlikely that 
firms fully adjust their capital stock due to a change in the output level in the current 
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period of time (in our case, within one year). Accelerator investment models where 
changes in the level of capital require longer time to move toward a new equilibrium 
implied by a change in the level of output are referred to as flexible accelerator 
investment models. Furthermore, it is assumed that changes in the capital stock from 
year 1t  to year t  follow an adjustment process by a proportion 1  of the difference 
between the actual and desired level of capital: 
(3)  
Next, we introduce replacement investment, i.e. the rate of the capital depreciation, in 
the flexible accelerator mechanism. As a result, the capital stock is expressed as the 
sum of the previous capital stock and the level of current investment minus the 
depreciation of the previous level of the capital stock (Jorgenson & Siebert, 1968): 
(4)  
Where   represents the constant rate of depreciation. From equation (4) we solve for 
tiI ,  and obtain: 
(5)  
From the flexible accelerator mechanism in equation (3) we now solve for tiK , and 
obtain: 
(6) 
1,,, )1( 
  tititi KKK   
To complete the flexible accelerator investment model we insert equation (6) into 
equation (5) and obtain: 
(7)  
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Finally, we integrate the capital to output ratio and the investment dynamics as captured 
by the lagged dependent variable to obtain the dynamic flexible accelerator investment 
model:5 
(8)   
Summarizing, if broadband investment is subject to a partial adjustment process, we 
expect that the coefficient estimate of the lagged dependent variable, λ, lies in the 
interval [0;1] where the lower limit indicates that adjustment takes place instantaneously 
and the upper limit indicates persistency, i.e. there is no convergence towards an 
optimal desired long-run broadband infrastructure stock. Furthermore, with α > 0 and 0 
< δ <1 we expect that the coefficient estimate of the (lagged) output variable is positive 
(negative). 
4. Data and variables 
Our dataset covers 23 EU member states and 57 firms, including 21 incumbents and 36 
entrants for the years from 2003 to 2012. Our panel data set is unbalanced, since data 
availability regarding the start and end of the time period varies by firms and countries. 
We use the following main data sources: EU progress reports provide country level data 
on total broadband lines, i.e. regulated wholesale lines, entrants’ own lines and 
incumbent’s own lines; Worldscope provides firm level data regarding capital 
expenditures, tangible fixed assets, sales and cash flow. Our sample comprises 57 
different firms,6 which vary widely in their size.7 Hence, we divide capital expenditures, 
sales and cash flows by the one period-lagged tangible fixed assets. The lagged 
                                                          
5
 The reader is referred to the Appendix for a detailed derivation of the dynamic flexible accelerator 
model. 
6
 The Orbis database enables the identification of firms that operate in wireline telecommunications 
markets, which correspond to NACE code number 611010. For the resulting list of operators we verified 
which firms are registered on the Stock Exchange Markets based on the International Securities 
Identification Number (ISIN) which enabled us to get the firm-level data from the Worldscope database. 
7
 There is a big difference not only between the incumbents and entrants, but also within incumbents and 
entrants. For example the mean of capital expenditures of the Austrian incumbent, A1 Telecom Austria, is 
€689 million, while the mean of capital expenditures of the Malta incumbent, GO PLC, is €18 million. On 
the other hand, the mean of capital expenditures of the entrant German Freenet AG is €80 million, while 
the mean of capital expenditures of the Polish entrant Telestrada SA is €47 thousand.  
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tangible fixed assets are used in order to eliminate the possibility of endogeneity 
between capital expenditures and the tangible fixed assets, since increasing capital 
expenditures may increase tangible fixed assets of the current period. In addition, we 
use several other data sources for our control variables: the World Bank (The World 
Development Indicators) and the International Telecommunications Union (World 
Telecommunication/ICT Indicators Database) provide us with the GDP per capita and 
the number of personal computers in use per capita, respectively. Finally, the European 
Central Bank and “MarketLine” enable us to introduce two additional control variables, 
namely, long term interest rate and population density, respectively. 
4.1. Dependent variable 
Our dependent variable, capex_as, represents firm level capital expenditures divided by 
the lagged tangible fixed assets in the telecommunications industry in terms of property, 
plant and equipment. This contains, most notably, investment in backbone and access 
networks. Note that whereas most of the incumbents are active in both fixed and mobile 
broadband markets, the entrants included in our sample are mainly offering fixed 
broadband services only. 
4.2. Independent variables 
Based on our hypotheses we divide our explanatory variables into the following three 
groups: i) access regulation in terms of the strictness of service-based competition ii) 
facility-based competition, and iii) control variables. The latter category contains 
variables related to our dynamic investment accelerator model as well as demand and 
cost controls. 
First, service-based competition, strictness , is measured by dividing the 
number of regulated lines (including unbundling, bitstream and simple resale lines) by 
the sum of the regulated lines and incumbent’s retail lines, thus showing the share of 
incumbent’s lines made available through the regulated wholesale market. Hence, this 
variable captures the strictness of service-based competition and is directly conducive 
to the regulatory “treatment” in terms of relevant wholesale broadband access 
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regulations. The variable strictness incorporates both the wholesale and retail market, 
since incumbent’s retail lines represent the lines which the incumbent uses internally to 
deliver its services to the customers in the retail market.  
Facility-based competition, fbc, is directly related to infrastructure investment 
of both the incumbent and entrants. Therefore, we employ two different variables, which 
enables the estimation of strategic effects regarding the incumbent’s and entrants’ 
investment decisions. First, facility-based competition is obtained as the share of the 
entrants’ own lines related to total number of retail broadband lines, fbc_ent. Entrants’ 
own lines show the number of broadband lines that are directly connected to entrants’ 
self-deployed infrastructure by using other technologies than DSL. Most notably, 
entrants’ own lines represent real investments of cable operators and a corresponding 
increase puts pressure on the incumbent in terms of a higher level of facility-based 
competition stemming from alternative infrastructure operators. In turn, the other facility-
based competition variable, fbc_inc, is obtained as the share of the incumbent’s retail 
lines related to total number of retail broadband lines.  
Regarding the group of control variables, we first refer to the variables related 
to our dynamic investment accelerator model. With respect to the desired level of capital 
stock (K*), there are different theories that assume that the desired level of capital stock 
is proportional to different indicators of business activity. According to the capacity 
utilization theory, the level of capital expenditures is positively related to the capital to 
output ratio (Jorgenson & Siebert 1968). According to Eisner (1978), applying sales as a 
main observable (proxy) variable of output (Y), the capital stock is expected to change 
with changes in sales and, thus, capital expenditures are taken as a distributed lag 
function of current and past sales. Accordingly, we include the sales to tangible fixed 
assets ratio, sales_as, and the one period lagged sales to tangible fixed assets ratio. 
Moreover, we introduce an additional firm level variable, namely, cash flow to tangible 
fixed assets ratio, cflow_as. Fazzari et al. (1988) examine the effects of asymmetric 
information on access to external funds and thus on the firms’ investment level. The 
authors conclude that firms that are financially constrained are more sensitive to the 
availability of internal funds, such as cash flow. There is a large literature that 
investigates the relationship between cash flow and investment, that takes into account 
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different factors that might explain this relationship, including: creditworthiness, size and 
ownership structure (Bond et al., 2003; Gugler, 2003; Kaplan & Zingales, 1997; 
Vermeulen, 2002). So, different coefficient estimates for the variable cflow_as in the 
incumbents’ and entrants’ equations point to different levels of cash constraints due to 
creditworthiness, size and ownership structure. 
Finally, we employ additional control variables to capture demand and cost side 
investment determinants: i) GDP per capita, gdp_pc, captures the income effects at the 
country level; ii) the number of personal computers in use per capita, comp_pc, reflects 
the importance of the information technologies for the population (ssuming that each 
computer has an internet connection, the variable comp_pc also stands proxy for the 
overall broadband market size); iii) the long-term interest rate, lt_ir, is expected to 
capture the cost of capital for long-term telecommunications investment and finally; iv) 
population density, pop_dens, shows different cost structures due to varying population 
densities across countries. 
All the variable definitions, expected signs and sources as well as summary 
statistics are listed below in Table 1 and Table 2, respectively.  
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Table 1: Variable description and sources 
Variable 
(expected sign) 
Description Source 
 Dependent variable  
 
capex_as 
Firm capital expenditures divided by lagged 
tangible fixed assets (property, plant and 
equipment) – capital expenditures to tangible 
fixed assets ratio. 
 
Worldscope 
 Main explanatory variables  
strictness         
(+/- incumbent; 
 +/- entrant) 
Regulated lines (including unbundling, bitstream 
and simple resale lines) divided by the sum of 
regulated lines and incumbent’s retail lines. 
EU Digital Agenda 
Scoreboard 
 
fbc_ent (+) 
The share of the entrants’ own lines related to 
total number of retail broadband lines. 
EU Digital Agenda 
Scoreboard 
 
fbc_inc (+) 
The share of the incumbent’s retail lines related to 
total number of retail broadband lines. 
EU Digital Agenda 
Scoreboard 
 
sales_as (+) 
sales_ast-1(-) 
Firm sales divided by lagged tangible fixed assets 
(property, plant and equipment) - sales to tangible 
fixed assets ratio. 
 
Worldscope 
 Control variables  
 
cflow_as (+) 
Firm cash flow divided by lagged tangible fixed 
assets (property, plant and equipment) – cash 
flow to tangible fixed assets ratio. 
 
Worldscope 
 
 
gdp_pc (+) 
 
Gross domestic product per capita in Euro. 
The World Bank - 
The World 
Development 
Indicators 
 
 
comp_pc (+) 
 
The number of personal computers in use 
normalized to population. 
World 
Telecommunication/ 
ICT Indicators 
Database 
 
 
lt_ir (-) 
Harmonized long-term interest rates among the 
EU Member States. The rates were accessed as 
secondary market yields of government bonds 
with a remaining maturity of ten years. 
 
EU Digital Agenda 
Scoreboard 
 
pop_dens (+) 
A country’s population density in persons per 
square kilometre. 
 
MarketLine 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
Variable #Observations Mean Std. deviation Min Max 
  
Firm level (Incumbents) 
capex_as 198 .1820146 .0675826 .0360704 .3243908 
sales_as 198     1.361392     .5035869     .419731    2.709114 
cflow_as 198     .3918595     .1371634    .1165235    .7541049 
  
Firm level (Entrants) 
capex_as 244 .413567 1.694773 .0007115 26.3725 
sales_as 302 12.28357 17.26536 0.0729615 105.4997 
cflow_as 300 .5876553 3.428136 -26.81395 10.07056 
  
Country level  
strictness 216     .2565829     .1750965     .000249     .695199 
fbc_inc 218        .4930646 .1313302           0 .9438086 
fbc_ent 215      .310205     .1836551     .002915     .761344 
gdp_pc 230     21787     11385 2349 43831 
comp_pc 230     .4729649     .2743952     .055061    1.232903 
lt_ir 230        4.652     2.221106         .57        22.5 
pop_dens 230     182.397     254.5591     17.1369     1280.74 
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5. Econometric modelling 
First, we describe our empirical baseline specification in Section 5.1 and then our 
estimation and identification strategy in Section 5.2.  
5.1. Econometric specification 
Our baseline specification refers to a dynamic reduced-form model in which investment 
expressed in monetary terms is specified for the operator i in EU member state j and 
year t as follows: 
(9) 
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where  0 , )1(1    and )1)(1(2   according to the dynamic 
accelerator model (equation (8)). 0  represents the coefficient of the lagged dependent 
variable.
1 measures the investment-output sensitivity which depends on the 
adjustment process. The difference between 
1  and 2  is that 2  also captures the rate 
of replacement investment. 
Our baseline specification includes the regulatory-induced service-based 
competition variable, strictnessj,t-1, and the facility-based competition variable, fbcj,t, as 
the main competition variables of interest. The latter variable measures the 
contemporaneous stock of infrastructure of the incumbents (fbc_incj,t) and the entrants 
(fbc_entj,t). In order to identify different causal effects and strategic interactions, we 
estimate equation (9) separately for incumbents and entrants. Based on our dynamic 
investment accelerator model, we include sales_asi,t and sales_asi,t-1. In addition, we 
include cflow_asi,t to control for firm-specific financial constraints, while other country 
level variables, such as, gdp_pcj,t, comp_pcj,t, lt_irj,t and pop_densj,t represent our 
demand and cost controls. Finally,   represents the intercept, 
i firm-specific fixed 
effects, t  time-specific effects, and ti,  represents the error term. 
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5.2. Estimation and identification strategy 
The desire to measure causation and to avoid endogeneity in spite of the reliance on 
non-experimental data is the key concern in empirical economics (Cameron & Trivedi, 
2005, p. 715; Wooldridge, 2002, p. 421). In estimating the baseline specification in 
equation (9), we are confronted with several sources of endogeneity: first, there might 
be potential endogeneity in terms of reverse causality underlying our regulation and 
competition variables, which are partly driven by the level of investment. However, the 
causal link between an increase of the level of investment and the number of 
(regulated) broadband lines within a period of time will be mitigated, since switching the 
broadband operator is subject to inertia due to long-term contracts with consumers 
(typically up to two years). Notwithstanding this, we include the lagged variable relating 
to service-based competition, strictnessj,t-1, which further mitigates potential endogeneity 
in case if there is no serial correlation in the original error term. However, we have to 
take into account endogeneity due to unobserved heterogeneity and the presence of the 
lagged dependent variable as a right-hand side variable (Nickell, 1981). 
Dynamic GMM panel data estimation techniques represent the most prominent 
candidate estimator that allows us to simultaneously consider all the aforementioned 
sources of endogeneity underlying our main explanatory variables related to competition 
in broadband markets as well as sales and cash flow at the firm level. Arellano and 
Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) show by Monte Carlo analysis that their 
general method of moments system estimator (GMM-SYS) has a smaller bias than the 
general method of moments difference estimator (GMM-DIFF) initially developed by 
Arellano and Bond (1991) for finite samples. In addition, Bruno (2005a, 2005b) 
developed a bias-corrected LSDV estimator (LSDVC) for unbalanced and dynamic 
panel data, which however requires that all other right-hand side variables are strictly 
exogenous. Therefore, we consider additional LSDVC estimations to test the 
robustness of our GMM-SYS estimation results. 
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6. Discussion of the main results 
Table 3 and Table 4 below show the main estimation results based on the specification 
in equation (9) for the incumbents and entrants, respectively. All standard errors 
reported are robust to arbitrary forms of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation in the 
ti, ’s for GMM and bootstrapped for LSDVC models.
8 The key identifying assumption 
underlying the GMM estimator is that the error terms in the original specification, ti, ’s, 
are serially uncorrelated. For all GMM models reported in Table 3 and Table 4 the 
Arellano-Bond AR(2) tests for zero autocorrelation in the first-differenced errors do not 
reject at order two at conventional levels. This implies, most importantly, that there is no 
evidence for serial correlation in the original error. Also, the Hansen-Sargan tests do not 
reject the over-identifying restrictions at the conventional levels in all GMM models. In 
addition, all explanatory variables, except cost and demand controls, are considered as 
endogenous in all GMM specifications. In order to avoid an overfitting bias in case of too 
many instruments employed in GMM models, we restrict the maximum number of 
lagged instruments to keep the total number of instruments close to the number of 
groups. Finally, Table 3 and Table 4 show regression results for alternative estimators 
(GMM-SYS vs. LSDVC) and for alternative selections of control variables. All the main 
variables of interest appear to be robust with respect to these alternative model 
specifications.9,10 
First, as regards the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable, capex_ast-1, 
Table 3 and Table 4 show highly significant and substantial estimates in all regressions 
indicating that the dynamic baseline specification is adequate. As expected, the 
coefficient is between 0 and 1. However, the coefficient estimates for the incumbent 
equation lie in the interval of [0.463; 0.790] which is substantially above the range of the 
corresponding estimates for the entrant equation [0.329; 0.543]. This indicates that 
there are adjustment costs underlying NGA deployment which are apparently much 
                                                          
8
 Stata 13.1 is used to estimate the regressions. 
9
 This also applies when we reduce the number of instruments by using the “collapse" option of STATA´s 
“xtabond2" command (results are available upon request from the authors). 
10
 Due to the variation in the entrants’ firm size we checked for potential outliers by excluding 1% of the 
largest observations. Estimation results remain robust and are available upon request from the authors. 
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more pronounced for the incumbent. A possible explanation for this is that investment 
data for the incumbent also contain investment in mobile network infrastructure, which 
involves comparatively high investment requirements and complex technical network 
planning as well as institutional rigidities due to limited spectrum licences. Another 
explanation would be that incumbents are simply larger and more diversified (active in 
all lines of businesses in the telecommunications sector), giving rise to smoother 
investment profiles than for entrants. 
Second, the coefficient of the variable sales_asi,t is significantly positive, whereas 
the coefficient estimate of the lagged sales variable, sales_asi,t-1, is significantly 
negative in all model specifications in Table 3 and Table 4. This represents strong 
supportive evidence for our dynamic flexible investment accelerator model as outlined in 
Section 3.3. Additionally, we can distinguish between the short- and long-run effects.11 
An increase in sales_as by 10%, increases the incumbents’ capex_as by up to 4% in 
the short-run and by 18% in the long-run. An increase in sales_as by 10% increases the 
entrants’ capex_as by up to 1% in the short-run and by 2% in the long-run. While the 
constant rate of replacement investment (δ) is almost equal for both incumbents (δ ~ 
0.12) and entrants (δ = 0.11) in the full GMM specifications, the low level of the 
coefficient estimate of the variables sales_asi,t and sales_asi,t-1 for the entrants is 
attributed to their low capital to output ratio ( ~ 0.0063). The cash flow variable, 
cflow_asi,t, shows positive sign as expected, but it is only significant for the entrants' 
equation in both GMM and LSDVC regressions. This in turn indicates that entrants 
might face difficulties to borrow money externally on the financial markets due to their 
smaller size, ownership, and creditworthiness. The positive and significant coefficient 
estimate shows that imperfect capital markets lead entrants to increase their investment 
level when internal funds get higher. An increase in cflow_asi,t by 10% increases the 
entrants’ capex_as by up to 0.3% in the short-run and by 0.4% in the long-run. 
Third, as regards facility-based competition in terms of the contemporaneous 
infrastructure stock, fbcj,t, the corresponding variables of the incumbent and entrant 
                                                          
11
 Short-run coefficient  21 ββ   for assales _ , analogous for the other coefficients and variables; long-run 
coefficient 
01 
 21 ββ for assales _ , analogous for the other coefficients and variables. 
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operators (fbc_incj,t and fbc_entj,t) exhibit significant and positive coefficient estimates 
throughout all regressions. This indicates that firms’ investment decisions are strategic 
complements and investment decisions reinforce each other as hypothesized in Section 
3.2. However, this effect is much more pronounced with respect to the entrants. Hence, 
if regulatory policies – broadly understood encompassing any sector-specific regulations 
– exert a strong direct impact on investment of the incumbent operators, there is also a 
substantial indirect impact on the investment activities of entrants. In addition, an 
increase in fbc_ent by 10% would lead to an increase in incumbents’ capex_as by up to 
1.5% in the short-run and by 5.7% in the long-run. On the other hand, an increase in 
fbc_inc by 10% would lead to an increase in entrants’ capex_as by up to 3.3 % in the 
short-run and by 5.9% in the long-run. 
Finally, the effectiveness of service-based competition as measured by the 
variable strictnessj,t-1, which hinges on relevant wholesale broadband access 
regulations, appears to have no significant impact on the investment decisions of 
incumbents and entrants on average, i.e. during the overall period of analysis. 
Insignificant coefficient estimates might be the outcome of the opposing effects 
identified in Section 3.1, but, they also indicate that there is no supportive evidence for 
the policy goal of promoting investment via service-based competition and the LoI 
hypothesis. Furthermore, the impact of service-based competition might depend on the 
different phases of liberalization and regulation. Most notably, it can be assumed that 
service-based competition promoted investment in the early phase of liberalization 
when infrastructure-based competition has been hardly established. In turn, with 
increasing levels of infrastructure-based competition and an effectively implemented 
and broadly established set of wholesale access obligations, the investment promoting 
role of service-based competition might have decreased. In particular, entrants who 
enjoy favourable access conditions will not further climb the LoI or even self-deploy 
infrastructure.  
Table 5 reports GMM regression estimates for incumbents (regressions (1)-(2)) 
and entrants (regressions (3)-(4)) where we additionally included the interaction term, 
i_strictnessj,t-1_dummy03_07, which captures the differential impact of service-based 
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competition in the first phase of liberalization, i.e. for the years from 2003 to 2007.12 The 
dummy variable takes on the value 1 for the years from 2003 to 2007, or else and the 
value 0. Indeed, we now find a neutral effect of service-based competition as regards 
entrants’ investment in the early phase and a significantly negative impact for the late 
phase of liberalization, i.e. for the years from 2008 to 2012. In turn, the impact of 
service-based competition appears to be insignificant for the entire period of analysis for 
incumbents.   
                                                          
12
 In defining the interaction term we equally split our period of observation. Estimation results, however, 
are robust towards different specifications of liberalization phases (results are available from the authors 
upon request).  
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Table 3: Regression results for incumbents’ equation 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable: GMM SYS GMM SYS GMM SYS LSDVC 
capex_asi,t         
capex_asi,t-1 0.771*** 0.790*** 0.712*** 0.463*** 
 
(0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0008) (0.0000) 
strictnessj,t-1 0.189 0.0280 0.0230 -0.00274 
 
(0.3892) (0.6443) (0.7095) (0.9505) 
fbc_incj,t 0.130* 0.0813** 0.101** 0.119* 
 
(0.0976) (0.0494) (0.0289) (0.0525) 
sales_asi,t 0.221*** 0.220*** 0.233*** 0.128*** 
 
(0.0076) (0.0043) (0.0038) (0.0000) 
sales_asi,t-1 -0.197*** -0.172** -0.170* -0.0532** 
 
(0.0026) (0.0224) (0.0641) (0.0309) 
cflow_asi,t -0.0144 -0.121 -0.128 0.0965* 
 
(0.9145) (0.2565) (0.1794) (0.0763) 
gdp_pcj,t 2.89e-11 -3.85e-11 
 
1.11e-11 
 
(0.8645) (0.8080) 
 
(0.9406) 
lt_irj,t -0.00393 -0.00240 
 
-0.000283 
 
(0.2288) (0.4312) 
 
(0.8416) 
pop_densj,t -0.00000180 
  
0.000949 
 
(0.9516) 
  
(0.8416) 
comp_pcj,t -0.000000116 
  
-4.44e-08 
 
(0.5303) 
  
(0.9567) 
Constant -0.0445 -0.000804 -0.0198 
 
 
(0.4579) (0.9886) (0.7117) 
      AR(1) test p-value 0.010 0.009 0.014 
 AR(2) test p-value 0.489 0.640 0.514 
 Hansen-Sargan-test p-value 0.836 0.896 0.905 
 R-sq.: within    0.6608 
#Instruments 21 21 21 
 #Observations 170 170 170 170 
Regressions (1)-(3) employ the two-step GMM system estimator. Regression (1) represents the full 
specification, while in regressions (2) and (3) we gradually reduce the number of control variables. In 
regression (4) we estimate the full specification using the LSDVC estimator. Since year dummies were 
jointly insignificant, we did not include them. Regressions (1)-(4) do include firm fixed effects which we 
do not report for the sake of brevity. p-values for the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and the Hansen-Sargan test 
of over identifying restrictions are reported. p-values for estimated coefficients are reported in 
parentheses and are robust to heteroscedasticity in GMM estimates. In regressions (1)-(3) the lagged 
dependent variable, capex_ast-1, and the main explanatory variables, fbc_entj,t, sales_asi,t, cflow_asi,t 
and strictnessj,t-1 are instrumented by maximum number of t - 4 lags. LSDVC standard errors are 
bootstrapped based on 100 iterations with bias correction for estimates up to order O(1/T).  
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table 4: Regression results for entrants’ equation 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable: GMM SYS GMM SYS GMM SYS LSDVC 
capex_asi,t         
capex_asi,t-1 0.329*** 0.311*** 0.537*** 0.543*** 
 
(0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
strictnessj,t-1 -0.0490 0.0140 -0.0698 0.0921 
 
(0.6394) (0.8591) (0.903) (0.479) 
fbc_incj,t 0.270** 0.287** 0.387*** 0.212** 
 
(0.0229) (0.0238) (0.0000) (0.0382) 
sales_asi,t 0.00421** 0.00398** 0.00597*** 0.00462*** 
 
(0.0201) (0.00193) (0.0000) (0.0076) 
sales_asi,t-1 -0.00369* -0.00343* -0.00599*** -0.00461*** 
 
(0.0717) (0.0768) (0.001) (0.0000) 
cflow_asi,t 0.0240* 0.0258* 0.0175** 0.0336*** 
 
(0.0746) (0.0500) (0.0150) (0.0004) 
gdp_pcj,t 7.84e-09 6.44e-09 
 
-5.27e-08 
 
(0.5650) (0.5439) 
 
(0.5889) 
lt_irj,t 0.00522 0.00257 
 
-0.000702 
 
(0.3691) (0.6121) 
 
(0.9310) 
pop_densj,t -0.000291 
  
-0.00136 
 
(0.2878) 
  
(0.6364) 
comp_pcj,t 0.00000124 
  
-0.00000233 
 
(0.3008) 
  
(0.3178) 
Constant -0.0239 -0.0520 -0.10295** 
 
 
(0.7937) (0.5141) (0.0264) 
 
     AR(1) test p-value 0.462 0.486 0.029 
 AR(2) test p-value 0.138 0.143 0.123 
 Hansen-Sargan test p-value 0.946 0.930 0.958 
 R-sq.: within    0.5684 
#Instruments 46 46 48 
 #Observations 177 177 177 177 
Regressions (1)-(3) employ the two-step GMM system estimator. Regression (1) represents the full 
specification, while in regressions (2) and (3) we gradually reduce the number of control variables. In 
regression (4) we estimate the full specification using the LSDVC estimator. Since year dummies were 
jointly insignificant, we did not include them. Regressions (1)-(4) do include firm fixed effects which we do 
not report for the sake of brevity. p-values for the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and the Hansen-Sargan test of 
over identifying restrictions are reported. p-values for estimated coefficients are reported in parentheses and 
are robust to heteroscedasticity in GMM estimates. In regressions (1)-(3) the lagged dependent variable, 
capex_ast-1, and the main explanatory variables fbc_entj,t, sales_asi,t, cflow_asi,t and strictnessi,t-1 are 
instrumented by a maximum number of t-4 lags. LSDVC standard errors are bootstrapped based on 100 
iterations with bias correction for estimates up to order O(1/T).  
 * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
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Table 5: Regression results for different phases of liberalization 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable: Incumbent Entrants 
capex_asi,t GMM SYS GMM SYS GMM SYS GMM SYS 
capex_asi,t-1 0.7253179*** 0.7389698*** 0.3645235*** 0.3724944*** 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
strictnessj,t-1 0.0785026 0 .0727734 -0.1919019** -0.1344174*** 
 0.579 0.228 0.045 0.005 
i_ strictnessj,t-1_dummy03_07 0.0025872 -0.0157678 0.2046678** 0.1562788* 
 
0.939 0.626 0.013 0.072 
fbc_entj,t 0.1319121** 0.1000161*   
 
0.040 0.092   
fbc_incj,t   .22495* 0.2226577* 
   0.083 0.100 
sales_asi,t 0.1811017*** 0.1604974*** 0.0063623** 0.004727** 
 
0.004 0.002 0.049 0.010 
sales_asi,t-1 -0.1347561*** -0.1292153*** -0.0067916** -0.0055017*** 
 
0.009 0.004 0.019 0.008 
cflow_asi,t -0.0887085 -0.0582102 0.0234413* 0.0263242*** 
 
0.523 0.533 0.052 0.008 
gdp_pcj,t 1.45e-10  6.32e-10  
 
0.395  0.879  
lt_irj,t -0.0011165  0.0092048  
 
0.753  0.315  
pop_densj,t -9.38e-06  -0.000228  
 
0.796  0.592  
comp_pcj,t 3.77e-07  1.38e-06  
 
0.745  0.321  
Constant -0.0402278 -0.0171992 0.003761 0.0471036 
 
0.463 0.574 0.972 0.543 
AR(1) test p-value 0.021 0.010 0.179 0.177 
AR(2) test p-value 0.668 0.594 0.093 0.057 
AR(3) test p-value   0.238 0.205 
Hansen-Sargan test p-value 0.994 0.974 0.903 0.818 
#Instruments 29 29 41 43 
#Observations 170 170 177 177 
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Regressions (1)-(4) employ the two-step GMM system estimator. Regressions (1) and (3) represent the 
full specification, while in regressions (2) and (4) we reduce the number of control variables. Since year 
dummies were jointly insignificant, we did not include them. Regressions (1)-(4) do include firm fixed 
effects which we do not report for the sake of brevity. p-values for the AR(1), AR(2) and AR(3) tests and 
the Hansen-Sargan test of over identifying restrictions are reported. p-values for estimated coefficients 
are reported in parentheses and are robust to heteroscedasticity in GMM estimates. In regressions (1)-(4) 
the lagged dependent variable, capex_asi,t-1, and the main explanatory variables, fbc_entj,t, sales_asi,t, 
cflow_asi,t and strictnessj,t are instrumented by maximum number of t - 4 lags. In regressions (3) and (4) 
the lagged dependent variable, capex_ast-1, and the main explanatory variables, fbc_entj,t, sales_asi,t, 
cflow_asi,t and strictnessj,t-1 are instrumented by maximum number of t - 5 lags, starting from t - 3 due to a 
significant value of the AR(2) test, therefore we also report the AR(3) test p-value for regressions (3)-(4). 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
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7. Conclusions 
This paper intends to assess the impact of the two main modes of broadband 
competition on investment in broadband markets utilizing firm level data for European 
incumbent and entrant operators in the decade from 2003 to 2012. 
We find that facility-based competition exerted a positive and substantial impact 
on investment for both types of operators and clearly outperforms service-based 
competition which had no significant impact for the average incumbent and entrant 
operator during the period of analysis. As regards the late phase of liberalization, 
service-based competition even exerted a significantly negative impact on entrants´ 
investment activities. Hence, data from a decade of broadband access regulation are at 
odds with one of the main guiding regulatory principles of the EU regulatory framework 
as envisaged in the LoI hypothesis. This casts doubt on future regulatory access 
policies which continue to foresee the LoI as a guiding principle also for regulating 
emerging fibre-based access networks (European Commission, 2010, recital 3). In turn, 
the role of facility-based competition appears to be even stronger as regards migration 
towards fibre-based infrastructure which will basically constitute more symmetric market 
structures with new and additional market players (Bourreau et al., 2010, p. 693). 
Therefore, and in line with the vast majority of the related previous literature, our 
findings suggest deregulatory approaches towards new access infrastructure with 
facility-based competition being one of the main drivers of investment in new 
communications access infrastructure. Regulatory policies should be directed from the 
asymmetric (legacy-based) regulatory paradigm to a more symmetric one focusing on 
an industry coordinating role and enabling cooperation models in the actual building and 
sharing of infrastructure (Gomez-Barroso & Feijoo, 2010; Briglauer & Gugler, 2013).  
In view of the empirical evidence, NRAs claiming that mandatory broadband 
access regulations remain necessary in the future shall bear the burden of proving 
convincingly that asymmetric market interventionism can be expected to be welfare 
enhancing. Moreover, NRAs have to consider that investment related policy decisions 
will exert a direct and indirect impact since firms’ investment decisions are strategic 
complements which reinforce the impact of an erroneous decision.   
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Appendix 
The dynamic flexible accelerator model  
By lagging equation (5) we obtain: 
2,1,1, )1(   tititi KKI           (A.11) 
Solving for 2, tiK we obtain: 
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IK
K           (A.12) 
By lagging equation (6) we obtain: 
2,1,1, )1( 

  tititi KKK           (A.13) 
Next we insert equation (1) in equation (7) and obtain: 
1,1,,, )1()1(   titititi KKYI         (A.14) 
In the equation (A.14) we insert equation (A.13) and obtain: 
   2,1,2,1,,, )1()1()1()1(     titititititi KKKKYI     (A.15) 
Next we reformulate equation (A.15) and obtain: 
2,
2
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  titititititi KKKKYI    (A.16) 
Now we combine equation (1) and (A.16) and insert the resulting expression in equation 
(A.12) and obtain: 
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Next we reformulate equation (A.17) and obtain: 
2,
2
1,1,1,1,,, )1()1)(1()1( 

  tititititititi KKKIYYI    (A.18) 
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Again we insert equation (A.13) in the equation (A.18) and obtain: 
   2,21,2,1,1,1,,, )1(1)1)(1()1(     titititititititi KKKKIYYI   (A.19) 
Next we reformulate equation (A.19) and obtain: 
2,
2
1,2,
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1,1,1,,, )1()1()1)(1()1( 
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  titititititititi KKKKIYYI   (A.20) 
Finally, we reformulate equation (A.20) and obtain our dynamic flexible accelerator 
investment model: 
1,,1,, )1)(1()1(   titititi YYII        (A.21) 
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